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The 1979 and 1983 general elections seemed to confirm two popular 
assumptions about British electoral politics - that there is a distinct 
polarization between 'Tory' England and 'radical' Scotland and Wales, and 
that the size of England means that Conservative Governments are thrust 
upon unwilling Scots and Welsh by the English majority. Certainly, in 1979 
the Conservatives won 59% of the seats in England and 53% in the United 
Kingdom as a whole, but won only 31% ofthe Scottish seats and 37% of the 
Welsh seats. Although Labour support in Scotland and Wales, as elsewhere 
in the United Kingdom, declined in 1983 as compared with 1979, Mrs 
Thatcher's 1983 'landslide' still left Labour with 57% of the seats in 
Scotland and 53% in Wales. 
Thus the immediate post-election reaction of The Scotsman in June 
1983 was thatOl: 
"As usual, Scotland is distinctive and different...Here in Scotland it 
is the Conservative Party which has fallen below 30% of the vote ... 
how many Scots can believe that they are being fairly treated when 
they get a Government which has only 21 of the 72 Scottish MPs?" 
Similarly the Glasgow Herald observed that<2l: 
"The elections have confirmed a separate voting pattern in Scotland 
and have also made it more complicated ... 70% of the Scottish vote 
was for non-Government candidates, and almost by definition this 
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But while the current partisan commitments of the component nations 
of the United Kingdom support the popular images of 'radical' Celts and 
'Tory' English, what of the broader historical picture? 
In comparison with elections over the longer term was the polarization 
between England and Celtic Britain exceptionally pronounced in 1979 and 
1983, and were these elections typical in producing a Labour-dominated 
Scotland and Wales within a Conservative-dominated United Kingdom? 
Over the years has the English Tory commitment been more consistent, 
and more pronounced, than the radical commitment of the Scots and 
Welsh? Is the contemporary Scottish and Welsh support for Labour more 
marked than their earlier support for the Liberals? In which particular 
elections have the contrasts between the partisan preferences of English, 
Scots and Welsh been most marked? To what extent has Engiand's partisan 
commitment been reproduced in the United Kingdom as a whole? Just how 
often have Scotland and Wales 'backed a loser' by electing more opposition 
MPs than government MPs? 
These and other questions will be examined in this chapter through an 
analysis of the partisan commitments of the component parts of the United 
Kingdom over the longer term - specifically the period since 1868. Three 
particular matters will be dealt with. In Section One the consistency and 
intensity of each nation's partisan commitment since 1868 will be 
examined, and in Section Two those elections in which Britain has been 
most conspicuously 'two nations' will be identified. In Section Three the 
extent to which, over the years, an English pattern of partisan commitment 
has been reproduced in the country as a whole will be considered. In the 
concluding Section some of the implications of the historical patterns that 
emerge will be discussed. 
I. Radical Celts and Tory English? 
Over the years how consistent and how intense has each nation been in 
its partisan commitment? Table I shows the extent of each nation's 
partisanship, as measured by the average share of seats achieved by the 
region's dominant party in elections in each of five sub-periods since 1868. 
The sub-periods were achieved by dividing the pre-1914 and post-1945 
periods so that each spans five to seven elections, and retaining the inter-
war years as a single period. Here and throughout the paper the 1918 
election is excluded from consideration because the nature of the contest on 
that occasion, between the Lloyd George Coalition and the several 
Opposition groups, defies analysis on conventional party lines. This leaves 
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twenty-nine elections from Gladstone's victory in 1868 to Mrs Thatcher's in 
1983. 
TABLE I 
Party Dominance in Component Nations of the UK: 
General Elections 1868-1983 (By Period) a 
Period(and Dominant Party by Nation and Period 
Number of (Average% of seats) 
Elections) UK England Scotland Wales lrelandb 
1868-86 (5) Lib 51.6 Con 54.8 Lib 76.2 Lib 75.4 Nat< 70.0 
1892-1910(6) Con 45.4 Con 55.7 Lib 71.0 Lib 82.9 Nat 80.5 
1922-35d (6) Con 60.6 Con 65.2 Con 43.0 Lab 53.3 Union86.1 
1945-59 (5) Con 50.5 Con 51.0 Lab 51.0 Lab 74.3 Union83.3 
1964-83 (7) Con 494 Con 54.4 Lab 60.0 Lab 69.1 Union87.6 
Lib/ Lib/ 







Excludes 1918 election which defies analysis on conventional 
party lines. 
Northern Ireland from 1922 
Nationalist figure includes various 'Home Rule' factions for 
the elections of 1868-80 
Conservative figures include National Liberal and National 
Labourfor 1931 and 1935. 
That is, the average for Northern Ireland 1922-83 
D.E. Butler and A. Sloan, British Political Facts 1900-79, London, 1980; 
F.W.S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1932-85, London, 
1977; F.W.S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1885-1918, 
London, 1974. 
Analyses across time always raise questions of comparability, and this 
is certainly the case with a study of parties and elections over 115 years. The 
'Conservative' label that is used here throughout the period embraces the 
Conservative Party of Disraeli, the Unionists (including the Liberal 
Unionists) at the tum of the century, the National Conservatives (and 
National Liberals and National Labour) of the 1930s, and the post-1945 
Conservative party in its Churchillian, Butlerite and Thatcherite forms. In 
effect, 'Conservative' covers a succession of parties in organisational and 
ideological terms. The term 'radical', which is transferred from the Liberals 
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of the pre-1914 period to Labour in the post-1918 period, covers an even 
more fundamental organisational distinction, and an even greater 
ideological spread, than is the case with the Conservative label(3l. 
Nevertheless, throughout the period under consideration it is possible 
to distinguish between a broadly right-of-centre 'Tory' party, and a broadly 
left-of-centre 'radical' party. It is this broad Tory-radical distinction that 
forms the basis of the analysis that follows. 
The use of seats rather than votes as the measure of party performance 
will inflate somewhat the extent of a region's partisan commitment, given 
the tendency of the plurality electoral system to reward the winning party in 
a given region with more seats than it has earned in votes. Nevertheless, it is 
the regional composition of the parties' representation in Parliament, 
rather than their grass-roots strength, which determines the party that 
holds office, and which provides on the floor of the House a daily reminder 
of the regional contrasts between the parties. 
The several extensions of the franchise have increased the electorate 
from approximately 16% of the adult population in 1868 to almost all adults 
today (now defined as those over 18 rather than 21). Similarly, the 
movement of population, and successive constituency boundary revisions 
to take note of this, mean that the constituencies are not distributed 
throughout the country in the way that they were in earlier periods. The 
electoral system, however, has retained its essential 'single-member 
constituency' and 'first-past-the-post' features throughout the period under 
consideration, so that the longer term comparisons are meaningful. 
It can be seen from Table I that over the 1868-1983 period as a whole 
the popular images of radical Scotland and Wales and Tory England are 
broadly accurate. In Scotland the 'left' party (Labour since 1922 and the 
Liberals before that) has won an overall majority of seats in twenty-one of 
the twenty-nine elections, has won a simple majority in another two and 
achieved a 'draw' in another<4l. 
The Scottish radical commitment, however, has varied in its intensity 
over the years. Between 1868 and 1910 the Liberals won a large majority of 
Scottish seats in every election except 1900. Indeed the Whigs or Liberals 
won a majority of Scottish seats in every election from 1832 to the end of the 
century. Between 1922 and 1955 the Scots were more ambivalent, and the 
Conservatives won a majority of Scottish seats as often as did Labour. Since 
1959 Scotland has returned to its nineteenth century pattern of 'consistent 
radicalism', giving a majority of seats to Labour in each of the last eight 
elections. 
Scotland's commitment to Labour has not equalled the extent of its 
nineteenth century attachment to the Liberals. Labour's best performance 
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in Scotland was in 1966, when it won almost two-thirds of the seats. The 
Liberals, in comparison, won over two-thirds of the seats in eight of the 
eleven elections between 1880-1910, and won over four-fifths of the seats in 
five of them. 
Wales has been even more consistently and intensely radical in its 
commitment than has Scotland. The left party has won a majority of Welsh 
seats in all twenty-nine elections since 1968, and has averaged over 70% of 
the seats. As in Scotland, however, Labour has been unable to achieve 
quite the degree of success in Wales that the Liberals sustained before 1914. 
Only in 1964 and 1966 has Labour won more than three-quarters of the 
Welsh seats, whereas the Liberals managed this in eight of the nine 
elections between 1880 and 1910. From its 1966 peak of almost nine-tenths 
ofthe Welsh seats, Labour's performance in Wales has deteriorated in each 
of the last five elections, and in 1983 reached its lowest level since 1935. 
That said, Wales has sustained a remarkably consistent patttern of 'left' 
party dominance throughout the period. 
Only England has been characterised by a consistent pattern of 
Conservative party dominance. The Conservatives have won a majority of 
English seats in twenty of the twenty-nine elections since 1868. Since 1885 
the Liberals or Labour have won an overall majority of English seats only 
on three occasions (1906, 1945 and 1966). 
The Conservatives achieved their greatest level of success in England 
at the end of the nineteenth century and in the 1930s. In post-war election 
wins the level of Conservative success in England has fluctuated within a 
fairly narrow band: even in 1983 the Conservatives won a smaller 
proportion of English seats than in most oftheir pre-1945 wins. 
In 1983 the Conservatives did win a bigger share of English seats than 
Labour won of Scottish or Welsh seats, but generally the English have been 
less intense in their commitment than have the Scots and Welsh. Only on 
seven occasions have the Conservatives managed to win two-thirds of the 
English seats. Six of these elections were before 1945, and three were 
between 1886 and 1900. 
Thus in partisan terms Great Britain has indeed long consisted of the 
'two nations' of Tory England and radical Wales and Scotland. What is 
more, Ireland has constituted a 'third nation' characterised by an 
idiosyncratic pattern of dominance by 'home-grown' parties. In Northern 
Ireland the Unionists have won at least three-quarters ofthe seats in every 
election since 1922, and have averaged almost nine-tenths of the seats. The 
Nationalists were almost as successful in the all-Ireland elections of 1885 to 
1910, winning around four-fifths of the seats on each occasion. 
The broad images of Tory England, radical Wales and Scotland and 
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idiosyncratic Ireland, however, need to be qualified in two important 
respects. First, the dominance of a party within 'its' nation has been far 
from total. The Unionists did win all the seats in Northern Ireland in 1924, 
1959 and 1964, and the Liberals came close to doing so in Wales in 1892 and 
1906. Apart from these cases, however, each region has given at least 10% 
(and usually much more than 10%) of its seats to parties other than its 
dominant party in every election since 1868. 
Labour (and earlier Liberal) success in Scotland and Wales has never 
been so complete as to deny the Conservatives a Celtic foothold. In 1979 
and 1983 the Conservatives won almost a third of the combined Scottish 
and Welsh seats, and even in 1923 (the Conservatives' worst performance 
in Celtic Britain in a 'winning' election<5l) they won a sixth. Over the years 
the Conservative Party in Parliament has been disproportionately English, 
but has been far from exclusively so. 
Equally, Tory England has always made a considerable contribution 
towards the Parliamentary majorities of Labour and Liberal governments. 
The Liberal governments' share of English seats ranged from just under 
half (in 1910) to over two-thirds (in 1906). Labour, in its election victories, 
has never won less than a quarter of the English seats, and has twice (1945 
and 1966) won an overall majority of English seats. 
Thus the nations of the United Kingdom have been predominantly, 
but not exclusively, Tory, radical and idiosyncratic in their respective 
commitments. Whichever party has been in power, the Government and 
the Opposition sides of the House have consisted of a regional mix -
although (as is discussed in detail in Section II) the precise extent of the mix 
has varied from one Parliament to another. 
The second major qualification to the national partisan images is that 
they do not necessarily apply to all of their regional sub-divisions. The 
notion of radical Scotland, for example, does not extend to Edinburgh or 
the rural north-east. Within Tory England, London normally returns a 
large majority of Labour MPs. Unionist dominance in Northern Ireland has 
distinct regional limits. In Wales there are some rural constituencies that 
have invariably resisted the radical tide. 
Regional sub-divisions, of course, can be extended almost indefinitely. 
Within Tory Edinburgh, there are some Labour strongholds; within these 
Labour areas there are some staunchly Conservative pockets; and within 
them will be some predominantly Labour inner-pockets. The principal 
concern here is with the broad national sub-divisions of the United 
Kingdom. Nevertheless, the sheer size of England demands that it be sub-
divided. 
Table II shows for the regions of the south, midlands and north of 
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England the dominant party's average share of seats in each of the five sub-
periods since 1868. The choice of these three broad divisions of England 
was partly pragmatic, in that election results for these particular regions 
were readily available for most of the period, and could be calculated for 
the rest of it<6l. South, midlands and north, however, are widely recognized 
regions of England, even though they are entirely unnofficial divisions, and 














Party Dominance in Component Regions of England: 
General Elections 1868-1983 (By Period) • 
Dominant Party by Region and Period 
(Average % of seats) 
England South Midlands North 
(5) Con 54.8 Con 61.6 Lib 50.1 Lib 54.5 
(6) Con 55.7 Con 65.2 Con 56.8 Lib 50.5 
(6) Con 65.2 Con 74.2 Con 65.9 Con 52.9 
(5) Con 51.0 Con 64.4 Lab 61.0 Lab 60.3 
(7) Con 54.4 Con 70.8 Lab 49.6 Lab 64.2 
Lib/ 
(29)Con 56.4 Con 67.7 Con 52.7 Lab 53.0 
Excludes 1918 election which defies analysis on conventional 
party lines. 
Conservative figures include National Liberal and National 
Labour for 1931 and 1935. 
D.E. Butler and A. Sloman, British Political Facts 1900-79, London, 1980; 
F.W.S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1932-85, London, 
1977; F.W.S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1885-1918, 
London, 1974. 
Of these three regions of England, the south provides much the 
clearest example of party dominance. In the period under consideration the 
Conservatives have won a large majority of seats in the south of England in 
each election except 1868, 1906 and 1945. The extent of the Conservatives' 
strength in the south of England has been almost as great as that of the 
Liberals and Labour in Wales. In all, the Conservatives have won three-
quarters of the seats in the south in ten of the twenty-nine elections, and 
have averaged over two-thirds of the seats. 
The midlands region has produced the most balanced pattern of party 
competition, with the Conservatives winning a majority of seats in 
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seventeen of the elections since 1868, and the 'left' party in twelve. This 
overall pattern, however, is a product of two contrasting periods. Before 
1945 the Conservatives were clearly dominant in the midlands. They won a 
majority of seats in thirteen of the seventeen elections, and in eight of them 
won over 60% of the seats. Since 1945 Labour has been more successful, 
winning a majority of seats in eight of the eleven elections. In 1979, 
however the Conservatives achieved their largest share of the seats the 
midlands since 1935, and improved on this in 1983. 
In the north of England the 'left' party has won a majority of seats in 
twenty of the twenty-nine elections. Again, however, there is a clear 
distinction between the pre-1945 and post-1945 periods. In the elections of 
1868-1935 the north of England was the least consistent of all the regions, 
usually changing its allegiance at every other election, but since 1945 
Labour has won a clear overall majority of seats in the north of England in 
each election. Thus in the north of England, as in the midlands, Labour has 
a better electoral record than had the Liberals before 1914- the reverse of 
the pattern that is found in Wales and Scotland. 
It is clear from Tables I and II that, taking the 1868-1983 period as a 
whole, there is a distinct south to north slope in the extent of the regions' 
commitment to the Conservatives. From the south of England, where the 
Conservatives have won a majority of seats in all except three of the 
elections since 1868, the extent of Conservative success declines 
northwards. 
This overall pattern, however, has not persisted throughout the 
period. The south of England has been the Conservatives' strongest region 
in all five sub-periods, but the other regions have changed position on the 
'most Tory -least Tory' continuum from period to period. In the 1868-86 
period the Liberals were marginally more successful in Scotland than in 
Wales; since 1945 Labour has usually done better in Wales and the north of 
England than in Scotland; in the 1945-59 period Labour did better in the 
midlands than in either Scotland or the north. 
The extent of the Conservatives' success between the wars was 
unusual. In each region the Conservatives averaged a bigger proportion of 
seats in the inter-war period than in any other, and only in that period were 
there more regions with a Conservative commitment than with a 'radical' 
commitment. Thus while the Conservatives' 'southern strength and 
northern weakness' is a long-established feature of British electoral 
behaviour, the precise nature and extent of that pattern has varied over the 
years. 
II. Two Nations 
In which particular elections have the partisan contrasts between 
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English and Celts been most marked? An indication of this is given in Table 
III which shows for each election since 1868 the proportion of seats 
achieved in England on the one hand, and in Celtic Britain (that is, 
Scotland and Wales taken together) on the other, by the party that won the 
election. The elections are ranked according to the extent of the contrast 
between the winning party's levels of success in these two parts of Britain. 
Table III thus provides an 'index of Anglo- Celtic electoral polarization' for 
the period since 1868. 
The range between the extreme points in the 'index of polarization' in 
Table III is considerable. At one end of the scale the Conservatives in 1922 
won almost four times as many seats in England as in Scotland and Wales, 
and in 1923 and 1892 they won almost three times as many. In 1945, 
however, Labour came close to doing equally well in each of the two parts 
of Great Britain. The 1945 election was thus doubly distinctive - as the 
election in which the Anglo-Celtic polarization was least pronounced, and 
as the one election since 1868 in which the 'left' party won a bigger 
proportion of seats in England than in Wales and Scotland. 
For the most part, Conservative wins have been accompanied by a 
greater degree of polarization between England and Celtic Britain than 
have the 'left' party wins. Labour's seven wins, together with the Liberal 
win of 1906, fill the bottom eight (that is, least polarized) places in Table 
III, while Conservative wins fill twelve ofthe fourteen top (most polarized) 
places. Indeed, the only Conservative victories that are in the lower half of 
the rankings are their wins of 1951 and 1955. In these two elections the 
Conservatives won a majority of seats in Scotland as well as in England, and 
this helped to produce (by the standards of Conservative wins) a relatively 
low level of Anglo-Celtic polarization. 
The other elections that are conspicuously 'out of place' in the rankings 
are the Liberal wins of January and December 1910. After their triumph 
throughout Great Britain in 1906, Liberal support in 1910 slumped in 
England but was sustained in Scotland and Wales. Indeed, in Scotland the 
Liberals won more seats in January 1910 than in 1906. This produced in 
1910 a much greater contrast between the two parts of Great Britain in the 
extent of the winning party's success than was the case in any of the other 
'left' party victories since 1868. 
In general, then, it is the left party wins that have reduced the contrasts 
between England and Celtic Britain while within this pattern Labour wins 
have minimised the differences even more than did Liberal wins. For the 
most part, Labour in its victories has achieved much the same level of 
success in England as did the Liberals in their victories. In Wales and 
Scotland, however, Labour has done appreciably less well than did the 
Liberals, averaging 'only' 62.2% of the Scottish and Welsh seats in its seven 
victories, compared with the Liberals' average of 83% for their six 
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TABLE III 
Anglo-Celtic Polarization in Regional Success of Winning Party: 
General Elections 1868-1983" 
Winning Party's Share Index of Rank Order 
of Seats Polarization 
(Larger share Lib/ 
Scotland as a proportion Con Lab 
Winning Party England &Wales or smaller share) Wins Wins AH 
1922 Con 63.5 17.9 3.55 1 1 1923 Con 45.4 17.0 2.67 2 2 1892 Con 57.2 22.1 2.59 3 3 1983 Con 69.2 31.8 2.18 4 4 1886 Con 73.0 33.7 2.17 5 5 1970 Con 57.1 28.0 2.04 6 6 1910J Lib 41.2 82.7 2.01 1 7 1910D Lib 41.0 80.8 1.97 2 8 1895 Con 75.2 38.5 1.95 7 9 1979 Con 59.3 30.8 1.93 8 10 1900 Con 72.8 40.4 1.80 9 11 1874 Con 62.1 35.2 1.76 10 12 1959 Con 61.6 35.5 1.74 11 13 1924 Con 73.0 42.5 1.72 12 14 1880 Lib 56.5 89.0 1.58 3 15 1868 Lib 53.6 81.3 1.52 4 16 1885 Lib 52.2 76.9 1.47 5 17 1935b Con 74.0 50.9 1.45 13= 18= 1955 Con 57.1 39.3 1.45 13= 18= 1951 Con 53.6 38.3 1.40 15= 20= 1931b Con 89.7 64.2 1.40 15= 20= 1964 Lab 48.1 66.4 1.38 6 22 1966 Lab 55.8 72.9 1.31 7 23 1906 Lib 67.1 87.5 1.30 8= 24= 1974F Lab 45.9 59.8 1.30 8= 24= 1929 Lab 46.6 58.5 1.26 10 26 19740 Lab 49.4 59.8 1.21 11= 27= 1950 Lab 49.6 59.8 1.21 11= 27= 1945 Lab 64.9 58.5 1.11 13 29 
a Excludes 1918 election which defies analysis on conventional 
party lines. 
b Includes National Liberals and National Labour. 
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victories. It is this factor that has produced the generally lower level of 
Anglo-Celtic polarization for the Labour wins than for the Liberal ones. 
The extent of the polarization between England and Celtic Britain was 
much less pronounced in the Conservative wins ofthe 1930s and 1950s than 
in their earlier and later victories. In all, seven of the ten most polarized 
Conservative victories date from the 1920s or earlier, while the three most 
recent Conservative victories fill the other 'top ten' places. In 1970 and 1979 
the Conservatives won almost exactly twice as many seats in England as in 
Scotland and Wales, and in 1983 they won more than twice as many. Even 
so, the extent of the polarization in 1983 was still much less marked than in 
the Conservative victories of 1892, 1922 and 1923. 
The broad Anglo-Celtic division, of course, ignores the marked 
differences in the partisan commitments of the English regions that were 
revealed in Table II. Despite the overall English commitment to the 
Conservatives it is only the south of England that over the years has been 
consistently 'Tory': the midlands have been ambivalent, while the north of 
England (at least in the last forty years) has been predominantly 'radical'. 
Thus in addition to the Anglo-Celtic division of Great Britain there is a 
clear partisan division between 'Tory' south Britain (that is, the south and 
midlands of England) on the one hand, and 'radical' north Britain (that is, 
the north of England, Scotland and Wales) on the other. 
In which elections has this polarization between 'north Britain' and 
'south Britain' been most pronounced? Table IV provides a measure of 
this, showing for elections since 1868 an 'index of north Britain - south 
Britain electoral polarization' based on the winning party's share of seats in 
the south and midlands of England on the one hand, and the north of 
England, Scotland and Wales on the other. The elections are ranked 
according to the extent of the contrast between the winning party's 
performance in these two parts of Great Britain. 
As with the Anglo-Celtic index, it is Conservative victories that have 
produced the greatest polarization between north Britain and south 
Britain, and 'left' party victories that have produced the least marked 
polarization. Conservative victories occupy five of the top six (most 
polarized) places in the rankings, while Liberal and Labour victories ocupy 
four of the bottom five (least polarized) places. That said, each party's 
victories are distributed rather more evenly among the rankings in Table IV 
than is the case in Table III. 
With both parties the pattern has been for the degree of polarization 
between north and south Britain to increase over the last forty years. In 
each of its post-war victories Labour has won around two-thirds of the seats 
in north Britain (though it did rather better than this in 1966), but in south 
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TABLE IV 
North-South Polarization in Regional Success of Winning Party: 
General Elections 1868-19833 
Winning Party's Share Index of Rank Order 
of Seats Polarization 
(Larger share Lib/ 
Sooth North as a proportion Con Lab 
Winning Party Britainb Britain' of smaller share) Wins Wins All 
1979 Con 71.9 31.7 2.27 1 1 
1983 Con 81.5 37.4 2.10 2 2 
1922 Con 72.0 36.5 1.97 3 3= 
1910J Lib 33.8 66.7 1.97 1 3= 
1970 Con 66.6 33.9 1.96 4 5 
1923 Con 51.9 21.1 1.92 5 6 
1910D Lib 34.8 64.3 1.85 2 7 
1974F Lab 35.5 64.9 1.83 3 8 
1892 Con 63.9 35.3 1.81 6 9 
1964 Lab 38.4 67.5 1.76 4 10 
1886 Con 81.5 47.3 1.72 7 11 
19740 Lab 39.2 66.8 1.70 5 12 
1959 Con 69.2 42.0 1.65 8 13 
1929 Lab 37.6 61.4 1.63 6 14 
1880 Lib 50.9 79.5 1.56 7 15 
1895 Con 81.8 52.7 1.55 9 16 
1924 Con 80.6 52.1 1.53 10 17 
1966 Lab 47.7 72.6 1.52 8 18 
1951 Con 60.1 39.1 1.51 11 19 
1955 Con 63.1 42.7 1.48 12 20 
1874 Con 65.7 44.3 1.47 13 21 
1950 Lab 42.9 61.1 1.44 9 22 
1900 Con 77.5 54.3 1.43 14 23 
1935d Con 80.6 57.8 1.39 15 24 
1885 Lib 52.0 68.6 1.32 10 25 
1868 Lib 53.5 65.7 1.23 11 26 
1931d Con 92.0 77.3 1.19 16 27 
1945 Lab 60.2 68.1 1.13 12 28 
1906 Lib 67.5 74.8 1.11 13 29 
a Excludes 1918 election which defies analysis on conventional 
party lines. 
b That is, south and midlands of England. 
c That is, Scotland, Wales and north of England. 
d Includes National Liberals and National Labour. 
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Britain Labour's share of the seats has declined from 60% in 1945 to not 
much more than a third in 1974. It is this variation in Labour's fortunes in 
the south and midlands of England, rather than in the country as a whole, 
that has been the key to the size of the party's post-war victories and to the 
extent of the polarization between north and south in those victories. 
The pattern of increased polarization between north and south Britain 
is even more pronounced in the case of Conservative victories. From 1931, 
when the Conservatives did very well in both parts of Britain, successive 
Conservative wins have produced increasingly polarized results, and their 
victories of 1970, 1979 and 1983 fill three of the top five places in the 
rankings. 
The particular extent of the polarization between north and south 
Britain in 1979 and 1983 was the product of exceptionally poor 
Conservative performances in north Britain, rather than unusually good 
performances in the south. Only in 1923 did the Conservatives do worse in 
north Britain (in a 'winning election') than they did in 1979, and their 
improved performance in north Britain in 1983 still left them with a smaller 
share of northern seats than in most of their wins. 
The extent of the increase in the polarization that has taken place over 
the last fifty years is emphasised by the contrast between the Conservative 
'landslides' of 1983 and 1935. In both elections the Conservatives won a 
similarly large share of the total seats in Great Britain<8>- 69% in 1935 and 
63% in 1983 (whereas in the 'super-landslide' of 1931 they won almost 
90% ). In south Britain the Conservatives did slightly better in 1983 than in 
1935, but in north Britain they managed little more than a third of the seats 
in 1983 compared with almost 60% in 1935. 
Taking Tables III and IV together, three particular points emerge. 
First, whether north and south are defined as 'England and Celtic Britain' 
or as 'south Britain and north Britain', Conservative victories have tended 
to produce a greater degree of polarization than have Labour and Liberal 
victories. Second, the most recent Conservative victories have produced a 
greater degree of polarization than have other elections in the post- war 
period, though in the case of the Anglo-Celtic divide the 1970, 1979 and 
1983 elections have not exceeded the very high levels of polarization that 
prevailed in the Conservative victories of 1892 to 1923. Third, in 1979 and 
1983 Britain was more conspicuously 'two-nations' if the two are defined as 
north Britain and south Britain rather than as England and Celtic Britain. 
Indeed, over the post-war period as a whole, the north Britain - south 
Britain divide has replaced the Anglo-Celtic divide as the most conspicuous 
regional electoral cleavage within Great Britain. 
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III. English Dominance 
To what extent has an English pattern of partisan commitment been 
reproduced in the United Kingdom as a whole? Even allowing for the over-
representation of Scotland and Wales in the House of Commons, England 
still accounts for some four- fifths of the seats. Thus a party that managed to 
win just under two-thirds of the English seats would have an overall 
majority in the Commons even if it did not win any seats at all outside 
England. Equally, even in the unlikely event of a party winning every seat 
in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, it would still need to win over a 
third of the English seats to achieve an overall majority. 
In 1979 and 1983 the Conservatives won a majority of the seats in the 
south and midlands of England, but not in Scotland, Wales, Northern 
Ireland, or the north of England. Just how unusual is this pattern? How 
often since 1868 have 'radical' Wales and Scotland been deprived of a 
Labour or Liberal government by Conservative success in England, and 
which of the nations, and which of the English regions have most often 
given a majority of seats to the party than won the election? 
Taking the 1868-1983 period as a whole, England has not imposed its 
particular pattern of party dominance on the rest ofthe United Kingdom. 
The regional patterns of partisan commitment that were described in 
Section One have qualified each other to a remarkable degree. Within 
England the persistent Conservative success in the south has been qualified 
by the success of the 'left' party in the north of England and (at least in the 
post-1945 period as a whole) the midlands. In combination, these regional 
patterns have produced in England as a whole a less marked pattern of 
party dominance than is found in the other nations ofthe United Kingdom. 
In its turn, this relative English ambivalence has qualified, but not nullified, 
the more pronounced partisan commitments of the other component 
nations. 
In the United Kingdom as a whole, there has been a relatively even 
pattern of party competition since the 1860s. The Conservatives have won 
sixteen of the twenty-nine general elections since 1868, twelve of the 
twenty-two since 1900, and six of the twelve since 1945. There is, however, 
a clear distinction between the inter-war period on the one hand, and the 
pre-1914 and post-1945 periods on the other. Between the wars, in what 
was essentially a transitional period of Liberal decline and Labour 
emergence, the Conservatives won large overall majorities in the 
Commons in four elections, achieved a simple majority in a fifth, and even 
denied Labour an overall majority in its one inter-war victory of 1929. 
Before 1914 and since 1945, in contrast, the distinct national patterns 
of party dominance combined to produce a broadly even party balance of 
power in the United Kingdom as a whole. In the 1868-1914 period the 
Liberals won six elections to the Conservatives' five, and each party was in 
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office for almost exactly the same amount of time. Similarly, since 1945 
Labour and the Conservatives have each won six elections, and have held 
office for similar amounts of time. 
Thus over the longer term the United Kingdom pattern of party 
competition has not been a coy of the English pattern, and the political 
complexion of United Kingdom governments has not simply been a 
reflection of the English partisan commitment. The point is emphasised by 
Table V, which shows the frequency with which each region has 'backed the 
winner', in the sense of giving a majority of its seats to the party that won 
the election. 
TABLEV 
'Backing the Winner' and 'Being in Office': Regional Support for the 
Winning Party 1868-19838 
Elections When Region 
















































Excludes 1918 election which defies analysis on conventional 
party lines. 
That is, the region gave more seats to the party that won the 
election than to the main opposition party. 
That is, the region had more MPs on the government side of the 
House than on the opposition side. 
Includes 1951 when Labour and Conservatives won the same 
number of seats in Scotland. 
Northern Ireland since 1922 
The significance of being 'on the winning side', of course should not be 
over-stated. Unless a region gives all of its seats to the losing parties it 
makes some contribution to the government's overall representation in 
Parliament. Nevertheless, there is a clear distinction between a region 
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giving only a minority of seats to the party that wins the election, and 
actually 'backing the winner' by giving it a majority of seats. The distinction 
is not constitutionally significant, but can be significant in other practical 
respects. 
The likelihood of a particular region 'backing the winner' in successive 
elections will be determined partly by the region's size, and partly by the 
flexibility of its commitment. The more populous the region, the greater 
the contribution that it will make to the overall result of the election, and 
thus the greater the likelihood that it will be on the winning side. At the 
same time, however, a region with a relatively small electorate could be on 
the winning side in every election if it was sufficiently flexible in its partisan 
commitment to transfer its support to the party that was nationally 
ascendant at a particular time. Given uniform partisan flexibility, every 
region could give a majority of its seats to the winning party in each 
election, and each government could claim to have been endorsed by every 
region of the country. 
It can be seen from Table V that each region has had some success in 
backing the winner, but no region has been consistently successful in this 
respect. There has been a clear contrast between the Scots and English on 
the one hand, and the Welsh and Irish on the other. The consistent Irish 
support for their home-grown parties since 1885 has meant that they have 
been on the winning side only in the case of the Liberal wins of 1868 and 
1880, and the nine Conservative wins between 1922 and 1970 when the 
Conservative-Ulster Unionist alliance was in operation. Consistent Welsh 
suppport for the 'left' party has meant that Wales has been on the winning 
side in only half the elections since 1868. 
In contrast, Scotland has been on the winning side in two-thirds of the 
elections over the period as a whole, and England in four-fifths. Indeed, 
since 1900 the Scots have done almost as well as the English in this respect. 
Although the English and Scots have exhibited distinct partisan 
commitments, and have backed 'their' party in each of its election victories, 
their loyalties have been sufficiently flexible for them to give a majority of 
seats to the 'other' party in half of its victories. Although the Scots have 
failed to back the Conservatives in their last four victories, and did not do so 
in any of the Conservative victories in the nineteenth century, they did give 
a majority of seats to the Conservatives in six of their eight victories 
between 1900 and 1955. 
England's ideological flexibility was most apparent at the beginning of 
the period, and England contributed a majority of seats to the winning 
party in all nine elections between 1868 and 1906. Since then England has 
backed the loser in five of the twenty elections- January and December 
1910, 1950, 1964 and February 1974.1t is not surprising that England, with 
the bulk of the sats in the Commons, has been on the winning side in most 
46 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1985 
elections. What is perhaps surprising is that England has failed to back the 
winner (or determine the winner) in as many as a quarter of the elections 
this century. 
Thus the political complexion of United Kingdom governments has 
not simply been a reflection of the English commitment. Still less, over the 
longer term, have United Kingdom governments been a reflection of the 
commitment of the south of England. Of the three English regions, the 
north and midlands have been sufficiently flexible to give a majority of seats 
to the winning party in (respectively) three-quarters and four-fifths of the 
elections since 1868. In contrast, the south of England's commitment to the 
Conservatives (broken only by the Liberal and Labour landslides of 1868, 
1906 and 1945) has meant that it has been on the winning side less often than 
the other two more ambivalent English regions. 
In effect the south of England's support for the Conservatives has been 
sufficiently consistent to prevent a majority of southern seats going to the 
left party in its winning years, but has not been sufficiently intense to 
overcome on every occasion the left party's strength in north Britain. Thus, 
far from the south of England determining the political complexion of 
United Kingdom governments, the south has had to live with governments 
to which it has contributed only a minority of its seats in almost half of the 
elections since 1945, and in more than half since 1964. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The answers to the questions that were raised at the beginning of this 
paper can now be summarised. 
I. While the images of 'Tory' England, 'radical' Scotland and Wales, and 
'idiosyncratic' Ireland have been broadly accurate over the longer 
term, there are distinct limits to their validity. In particular, Scotland's 
radical image needs to be qualified in that Wales throughout the period, 
and the north and midlands of England since 1945, have averaged a 
larger proportion of 'left' party seats than has Scotland. While Labour 
has done appreciably better in Scotland since 1959 than it did between 
1922 and 1955, it has still not matched the level of success achieved by 
the Liberals in Scotland in the nineteenth century. 
2. Although throughout the period Great Britain has indeed consisted, in 
partisan terms, of 'two nations' (with Ireland as a separate 'third 
nation'), the extent of the polarization between Tory south and radical 
north has varied according to just how 'north' and 'south' are defined. 
The polarization between England and Celtic Britain was more 
pronounced in the period of Liberal-Conservative competition before 
1914 than it has been in the modern period of Labour-Conservative 
competition, while the reverse is true of polarization between 'south 
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Britain' (that is, the south and midlands of England) and 'north Britain' 
(Scotland, Wales and the north of England). There was a greater 
degree of polarization between south Britain and north Britain in 1979 
and 1983 than in any other general election since 1868. 
3. An English pattern of Conservative party dominance has not been 
reproduced in the United Kingdom as a whole. The Scots have given a 
majority of seats to the party that won the election almost as often as 
have the English, and the supposedly dominant south of England has 
been on the losing side in more general elections than have the north, 
midlands or Scotland. Rather than reflecting an English pattern of 
Conservative dominance, the United Kingdom as a whole has had its 
own distinctive pattern of relatively even two-party competition. 
It has to be emphasised again that the regional patterns that have been 
described in this paper are based upon the seats won by the parties, and thus 
reflect regional representation in Parliament rather than the regional 
distribution of electoral support. The British first-past-the-post electoral 
system distorts the relationship between votes and seats by giving the 
dominant party in any particular region a larger share of seats than it has 
'earned' in votes. It thereby magnifies regional partisan differences. The 
regional contrasts would be reduced somewhat if the established electoral 
system was replaced by one that achieved a more precise relationship 
between the parties' votes and seats. The tendency for the established 
electoral system to exaggerate regional differences, however, is generally 
under-stated in debates about the desirability of electoral reform. 
A rna jor consequence of the regional patterns that have emerged from 
the established electoral system over the years is that successive British 
governments have been regionally unrepresentative to a quite marked 
degree. The government side of the House has been disproportionately 
'southern' whenever the Conservatives have been in office, and 
disproportionately 'northern' when Labour or the Liberals have been in 
power. In none of the elections since 1868 has a party won a majority of 
seats in all six of the regions of the United Kingdom that have formed the 
basis of this analysis, and not since 1880 has a party achieved a majority of 
seats in each of the four nations. Even if idiosyncratic Ireland is excluded 
from consideration, only twice (1906 and 1945) has a party won a majority 
of seats in all five regions of Great Britain, and only on six occasions (all of 
them Liberal or Labour victories) has a party won a majority of seats in the 
three nations of Great Britain. 
Within this general pattern of narrowly-based governments, however, 
the 1979 and 1983 elections produced a government with a particularly 
limited regional base. Since 1979 the Conservative benches have been even 
more disporportionately 'southern' than usual. For the first time since 1892 
the winning party achieved a majority of seats in just two of the six regions 
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of the United Kingdom. Not since at least the 1850s have the south and 
midlands of England (as in the 1979 and 1983 Parliaments) accounted for 
three quarters of the MPs on the Government side of the House. In all, less 
than 10% of Conservative MPs elected in 1979 and 1983 camefrom Scottish 
and Welsh seats (the smallest proportion since the 1920s), and only 16% 
came from the north of England (the smallest proportion for a hundred 
years or more). 
Constitutionally, of course, a government's position is unaffected by 
the extent of its regional support: a government holds office because it is 
supported by a majority of MPs, regardless of their regional origins. 
Politically, however, it is clearly undesirable for a government to have an 
exceptionally narrow regional base. Despite some temptation for a 
Government to woo those areas in which it is electorally weak, a region that 
has a disporportionately small number of MPs on the government side of 
the House is likely to be at a disadvantage in the Parliamentary battle for 
government favours. Certainly, regional justice is not seen to be done if a 
government does not have a broad regional base. This matters more today 
than in the nineteenth century, or even before 1945, because the electorate 
is now more sensitive to regional disparities. For the most part regional 
inequalities are regarded as undesirable, and the government of the day is 
seen as having an obligation to do something about them. The notion of 
'regional mandates' is popular, and the government's Ie~itimacy is 
questioned by groups that are dominant in particular regions. (9 
Given these considerations a regionally dominant party that today 
finds itself persistently in opposition might be tempted to 'play Parnell' and, 
like the Irish Nationalists in the 1880s, seek to emphasise its role as a 
champion of regional interests by obstructing the proceedings of 
Parliament. It might even be tempted to follow Sinn Fein's tactics after the 
1918 election of boycotting Westminster and meeting as a regional 
assembly. 
Clearly, the parallels between the 1980s and the 1880s, or 1918, cannot 
be taken too far. Among other things, the Irish Nationalists and Sinn Fein 
had specific and limited legislative objectives; they did not seek to present 
themselves as an alternative government of the United Kingdom; they held 
a bigger proportion of Irish seats than Labour holds of Scottish, Welsh or 
north of England seats; Parliamentary procedures in the nineteenth 
century gave greater opportunities for disruption than they do today. What 
is more, regional MPs who pursue such tactics ostracise themselves from 
the established processes of Parliamentary Opposition, and may 
undermine their party's credibility as a responsible United Kingdom force. 
Nevertheless, as a means of drawing attention to regional discontents, 
the Parnell and 1918 Sinn Fein options might be attractive to a frustrated 
Opposition which feels that although it has lost two successive elections, it 
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is nevertheless the true voice of large areas of the United Kingdom. 
Certainly the prospect of a Labour-dominated Scotland within a 
Conservative-dominated United Kingdom, prompted Scottish Labour 
MPs to consider such tactics even in the last Parliament. 
Regardless of whether Opposition MPs choose to adopt the Parnell or 
Sinn Fein options, or simply use the more conventional processes of inter-
party debate to highlight the exceptional narrowness of the Conservative 
Government's regional base, the current situation has clear dangers for the 
established system of Parliamentary representation. The possibility is that, 
in the face of an extended period of office by an exceptionally narrowly 
based government, whole regions will become disillusioned with their 
continued under-reprepresentation on the Government benches and will 
prefer direct action to Parliamentary action as the means of bringing 
pressure to bear on Ministers. 
In the past the significance of the regionally unrepresentative nature of 
British governments has been reduced by the fact that our governments 
have tended to be relatively short-lived. As has been shown elsewhere,<10> 
the parties alternate in office much more regularly in Britain than in other 
European and Anglo-American countries. In Britain over the last 150 years 
there has been a change of party or parties in office every four years on 
average;<11> there have been only four governments that have survived for 
more than eight years;(l2) and 'Conservative' and 'non-Conservative' 
governments have held office for broadly equal amounts of time. 
Thus over the years each region has seen 'its' party in office at fairly 
frequent intervals. It is true that Wales and the north of England were 'in 
opposition' (in the sense of having more MPs on the Opposition side of the 
House than on the government side) for the whole of the 1951-64 period of 
Conservative government, but that was an atypical experience. For the 
most part, since at least 1868 each region of Great Britain has alternated 
regularly between being 'in office' and being 'in opposition'. 
It remains to be seen whether this pattern will continue in the 
immediate future. There are three main possible scenarios. The next 
general election might return a revived Labour Party to office with a 
regional pattern of support similar to that of the 1960s, thereby giving 
Scotland, Wales and the north of England 'their tum' in having a rna jorityof 
their MPs on the Government side of the House. Alternatively, the 
established pattern of regional partisanship might not survive the strains to 
which it has been subjected in recent years. It is at least possible that the 
SOP-Liberal Alliance will threaten Conservative dominance in the south, 
and Labour dominance in north Britain, while the nationalist parties 
remain in the wings as other potential threats to Labour's current strength 
in Scotland and Wales. If the mould of regional party dominance is indeed 
broken in the 1980s and 1990s, and Britain experiences a succession of hung 
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Parliaments as a result, a coalition might emerge that will be broadly based 
regionally as well as ideologically. 
A third distinct possibility, however, is that the Conservatives are 
currently launched upon an extended period in office, that a third 
successive victory will confirm them in office into the 1990s, with 
government benches that are at least as disproportionately southern as in 
the present Parliament. It should be realised that for the Conservatives to 
win a further general election with a majority of seats only in the southern 
half of England would be an unprecedented development. In their other 
long spells in ofice, in the 1950s, 1930s and at the turn of the century, the 
Conservative benches were much more regionally representative than in 
the 1979 and 1983 Parliaments. Certainly, Scotland returned a majority of 
Conservative MPs in 1900, 1924, 1931, 1935 and 1955 (and tied with Labour 
in 1951), and over the last hundred years Scotland has had the experience of 
being 'on the losing side' for no more than one Parliament at a time. In the 
context of the increased regional awareness of recent years, an extended 
period of office for a Conservative Government that holds only a minority 
of seats in Scotland, Wales and the north of England might well impose 
greater regional strains upon the political system than it has experienced 
since the Irish troubles of the 1880s. 
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